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APPRENDI AT 20: REVIVING THE JURY’S ROLE IN 
SENTENCING* 
STEPHANOS BIBAS** 
When I was in law school in the early 1990s, if we had done a retrospective 
on the twentieth or twenty-fifth anniversary of criminal procedure, it would 
have been about the Warren Court versus the early Rehnquist Court.1 It would 
have been about the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. It would have been about 
the due-process versus crime-control models or law and order versus 
defendants’ rights.2 A mark of how much things have changed, and how 
different the debate is today, is that here we are talking about the Sixth 
Amendment, and we are not discussing a stale left-right debate. 
This Symposium focuses on maybe the most fertile and interesting area of 
criminal procedure in the twenty-first century. The Constitution’s jury-trial 
guarantees, both in Article III and in the Sixth Amendment, provide that the 
trial of all crimes or in all criminal prosecutions shall be by jury.3 Juries were 
designed to be central checks on the legislature, executive, and judiciary.4 But 
the Constitution left unanswered a major question: What sentencing-related 
decisions count as part of a criminal trial or a criminal prosecution and so trigger 
the jury-trial rights? Back in the eighteenth century, felonies led to fixed 
punishments unless there was executive clemency,5 of which there was a fair 
 
 *  © 2021 Stephanos Bibas. 
 **  Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to Carissa Hessick for organizing this conference and to my law 
clerk Julia Fine for excellent research assistance. 
 1. See generally Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century 
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing the Warren Court’s innovations in criminal procedure 
and the fate of those changes in the ensuing decades); Stephen F. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and 
Criminal Procedure, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1337 (2002) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s rollback of 
defendant-friendly Warren Court precedents). 
 2. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149–73 (1968) 
(discussing the values underlying the due-process and crime-control models). 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury . . . .”); id. amend. VI 
(“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury . . . .”). 
 4. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (“The purpose of the jury trial . . . is to 
prevent oppression by the Government.”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968); Jenny 
Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 829–35 (2015) (discussing the jury’s role as a 
check on the power of formal government). 
 5. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478–80 (2000). 
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amount.6 Imprisonment was not a common form of punishment, and there was 
no separate sentencing phase.7 
This began to change right around the time of the Founding. The first 
Congress passed a bill that called for mandatory, specific punishments for some 
offenses but let judges choose among a broad range of punishments for others.8 
Shortly after that, the United States moved to using imprisonment frequently 
and allowing a large degree of flexibility in imposing sentences.9 So, by the early 
nineteenth century, judges had broad discretion to sentence within wide 
ranges.10 
The result was a dichotomy in criminal procedure. Jury trials required 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, live hearings, witnesses, and rules of 
evidence.11 Sentencings, by contrast, required no standard of proof, no 
witnesses, and no rules of evidence or procedure; rank hearsay was the norm.12 
Williams v. New York13 in 1949 exemplified this high-water mark of 
untrammeled judicial discretion.14 
Perhaps that dichotomy was tolerable as long as the two stages were doing 
separate things: The jury trial was historical, backward-looking, factual, and 
focused on whodunit.15 The sentencing was forward-looking, assessing 
amenability to rehabilitation, as Williams put it.16 To the Williams Court, this 
was the inevitable march of progress.17 
 
 6. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 54 (2002); Paul J. 
Larkin, Jr., Revitalizing the Clemency Process, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833, 851–54 (2016). 
 7. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478–79 (“The defendant’s ability to predict with certainty the 
judgment from the face of the felony indictment flowed from the invariable linkage of punishment 
with crime.”); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty 
Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1124–26, 1124 n.204 (2001) [hereinafter Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding]. 
 8. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 9. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978), superseded by statute, Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, FAIR AND CERTAIN 
PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL 
SENTENCING 85–87 (1976); Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 1125–26. 
 10. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 9, at 87–88; Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding, supra note 
7, at 1125–26. 
 11. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246–47 (1949). 
 12. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 246–47; James J. Bilsborrow, Note, Sentencing Acquitted Conduct to 
the Post-Booker Dustbin, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 289, 300–02 (2007). 
 13. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 14. See id. at 249–52; Bilsborrow, supra note 12, at 301. 
 15. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 246–47. 
 16. See id. at 247–48, 248 n.13. 
 17. See id. at 247–48. 
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But by the 1970s, the pendulum had swung back from rehabilitation to 
retribution.18 And the sentencing reform movement began to create sentencing 
guidelines to structure and channel judicial sentencing discretion based on the 
severity of crimes and criminal records, as well as various aggravating and 
mitigating factors.19 So rather than exercising open-ended, therapeutic 
discretion in the name of rehabilitation, judges were now finding discrete facts 
that led to particular punishments.20 This system looked better suited to satisfy 
due-process-type values like notice, predictability, and procedural safeguards.21 
But it also looked like judges were usurping the fact-finding role of juries.22 A 
fact that triggered a particular sentence was a sentencing factor that a judge 
could find by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than an element of the 
crime that a jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt.23 
At first, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,24 the Supreme Court blessed this 
approach as a continuation of sentencing discretion.25 But by 2000, Justices 
Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg had won over Justice Thomas, joining 
together in Apprendi v. New Jersey26 to hold that any fact that increases a 
maximum sentence (except recidivism) is an element that must be proved to a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.27 The Court extended that holding to death-
penalty eligibility in Ring v. Arizona28 and to state sentencing guidelines in 
Blakely v. Washington.29 Then, the curiously splintered opinion in United States 
v. Booker30 found that binding federal guidelines were unconstitutional.31 The 
 
 18. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. 
U. L. REV. 843, 845–46 (2002). 
 19. See Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Emperor’s New Clothes: Due Process Considerations Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 60 TENN. L. REV. 467, 484–86 (1993). 
 20. See id. at 484–85. 
 21. See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of the Offender, 
and Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 181, 181–83 (1988). 
 22. See Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 304 (1992). 
 23. Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 1099–100. 
 24. 477 U.S. 79 (1986), overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (plurality 
opinion). 
 25. Id. at 86. 
 26. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 27. Id. at 490. 
 28. 536 U.S. 584 (2002); id. at 609. 
 29. 542 U.S. 296 (2004); id. at 305. 
 30. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 31. Id. at 258–59. 
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Court remedied that problem not by requiring juries to find facts, but rather by 
making the federal guidelines advisory—sort of.32 
These cases are admirable because they confronted fundamental issues of 
criminal law that had long lain dormant: What is a crime? Is it whatever the 
legislature labels a crime? And what facts trigger punishment? Must all facts 
that justify punishment be included in the definition of the crime itself? For 
too long, we have ignored the linkage of crime and punishment. At English 
common law, jury trials were about both liability and punishment, as juries 
manipulated their verdicts to calibrate punishments to crimes.33 But as 
sentencing rules proliferated, sentencing judges decided more and more facts 
that might otherwise have been the province of juries.34 Until Apprendi, courts 
had never delineated what procedures were needed at sentencing and what 
issues were reserved for juries.35 Apprendi and Blakely linked criminal procedure 
to substantive criminal law, as they tried to define crimes and the procedures 
needed to link punishments to crimes.36 
The Apprendi line of decisions was grounded in originalism and 
formalism.37 As an originalist matter, juries, not judges, had to find guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.38 And as a formalist matter, Justice Scalia argued that if the 
Court did not draw a line at these elements, then legislatures and guidelines 
could endlessly erode the province of juries.39 That is how the more originalist 
Justices Scalia and Thomas formed an unlikely coalition with the more due-
process-oriented Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.40 
The problem, though, is that twenty-first-century criminal procedure does 
not fit within eighteenth-century boxes. At the time of the Founding, 
imprisonment was not widely used as a punishment,41 and there was nothing 
 
 32. Id. at 259–60. 
 33. Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 1124 & n.204. 
 34. See Herman, supra note 22, at 304. 
 35. See Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 1102. 
 36. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 478, 482–84 (2000). 
 37. Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, 
the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 195 (2005) [hereinafter Bibas, Originalism 
and Formalism]. 
 38. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478. 
 39. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306–08; see Bibas, Originalism and Formalism, supra note 37, at 194 & n.82. 
 40. Bibas, Originalism and Formalism, supra note 37, at 194. 
 41. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 9, at 84–87 (explaining that “[i]ncarceration as 
a punishment for the purposes of rehabilitation was practically nonexistent” until the late eighteenth 
century). 
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like modern sentencing.42 Plus, there was no plea bargaining.43 But today, 
hardly any cases go to juries anymore.44 The real battle for power is not judges 
versus juries at trial, but judges versus prosecutors at sentencing (or in plea 
bargains based on sentencing forecasts). Plea bargains specify facts that trigger 
statutory and guideline sentences. 
More generally, the Booker remedy for federal sentencing is a truly odd 
bird. Though it purported to loosen and transform the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines,45 it left in place a system that prizes technical procedures and 
mathematical computations over moral evaluation and reason-giving.46 That 
may perhaps promote more uniform sentences,47 a topic on which there is much 
debate.48 But it does not promote the more populist, democratic checks that the 
Sixth Amendment was designed to ensure.49 
As a newish federal judge, the most striking thing about the sentences that 
I review on appeal is how routinized they are. Judges check a series of boxes.50 
It is often hard to tell from the paper record why a judge chose a particular 
sentence. In the best of cases, I read transcripts of sentencing judges engaging 
personally with the flesh-and-blood defendant before them. But all too often, it 
looks as if a defendant has been sentenced by computer. Perhaps the proceeding 
is more moving in person than it looks on paper; perhaps not. But the kind of 
 
 42. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478–80. 
 43. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979) 
(“[P]lea bargaining did not occur with any frequency until well into the nineteenth century . . . .”). 
 44. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“[O]urs ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, 
not a system of trials . . . .’” (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012))); Elizabeth N. Jones, 
The Ascending Role of Crime Victims in Plea-Bargaining and Beyond, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 97, 105 (2014) 
(“[P]lea-bargaining is so common that it is almost uncommon to find a criminal case in which plea-
bargaining does not occur . . . .”). 
 45. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005). 
 46. See Graham C. Mullen & J.P. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic State of Sentencing 
After United States v. Booker, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 625, 631–32 (2007) (discussing the mechanical, 
trial-level procedures that the Fourth Circuit requires to uphold a sentencing decision under 
reasonableness review). 
 47. See id. at 625 (“[N]early two-thirds of all sentences are within the prescribed Guidelines range, 
a difference of less than ten percent from pre-Booker levels.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 52 (2010) (“Consistent with anecdotal reports from around the country, the first empirical 
study of individual judges’ responses to Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall reports a spike in inter-judge 
sentencing disparity.”). 
 49. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & William W. Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst, 
66 UCLA L. REV. 448, 473 (2019) (explaining that the Booker remedy failed to “vindicate Sixth 
Amendment . . . values”). 
 50. See United States v. Pruitt, 813 F.3d 90, 91, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2016) (expressing concern that 
the “check-a-box section” of a required form for sentencing judges discourages them from providing 
reasons for the sentences they impose); Mullen & Davis, supra note 46, at 631–32. 
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intensely personal, face-to-face confrontation that the Founders prized is not 
happening as often as it should in our mechanized system of justice. 
The other disappointment is that the Guidelines hardly seem to be 
working as planned. The ideal was that experts would be in charge of drafting 
and revising them and that they would continue to revise them in light of the 
lessons of experience.51 Reason-giving and appellate review would create a 
feedback loop, encouraging the U.S. Sentencing Commission to do more of 
what worked and less of what did not.52 
But from the start, the experts rejected tethering the Guidelines to one 
dominant purpose of punishment, like retribution or deterrence.53 Then 
Congress started stepping in and overriding the Commission instead of 
deferring to it.54 And despite many years of criticism of the Guidelines’ 
mechanistic approach, the Commission does not revisit its fundamental 
structure but largely tinkers at the margins.55 
Is there a way back within our high-volume, plea-bargaining assembly 
line? Or is Apprendi a ringing symbolic victory with little obvious payoff on the 
ground? Can sentencing guidelines, appellate review, or the like be salvaged, or 
should they be junked? Is there a way to make the role of juries more 
meaningful? Our distinguished panel of scholars will address these and other 
questions over the next couple of hours as well as in their essays. 
 
 51. Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (2005) (“[T]he Sentencing Commission was intended to gather 
feedback about how the system worked and serve as an authoritative (though not final) body of neutral 
experts who would translate the feedback into sensible revisions of the rules.”). 
 52. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1639 (2012). 
 53. Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Troubling 
Silence About the Purposes of Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2003) (explaining that the 
Sentencing Commission “refused to address or identify the purposes of punishment that ground the 
guideline system”). 
 54. See Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing After Booker, in 48 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH 137, 138 (Michael Tonry ed., 2019) (asserting that Congress “[did] not avoid 
micromanaging the commission’s work” and enacted laws that “override the guidelines wherever they 
conflict”). 
 55. See, e.g., William K. Sessions III, The Relevance of Offender Characteristics in a Guideline System, 
51 HOUS. L. REV. 1211, 1220–22 (2014) (discussing the Commission’s “modest” steps toward including 
offender characteristics as relevant sentencing factors). 
